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Forests contribute to mitigating climate change in two ways: by sequestrating carbon in forest
biomass and in timber products – "stock eﬀect" –, and by replacing fuelwood with fossil-fuel and
non-timber with timber products, the production of which is less energy- and emissions-intensive
–"substitution eﬀect" ([Naaburs et al., 2007]).
Though both contributing to the same environmental goal, stock and substitution policies are
markedly diﬀerent. Policies that favor the stock eﬀect (hereafter "stock policies") will focus on the
upstream part of the forest sector, whereas policies that favor substitution eﬀects ("substitution
policies") will focus on the transformation and on the demand for timber products. Though markets
should redistribute rents throughout the sector, stakeholders within the sector are clearly very
sensitive to where the policy applies.
In addition, stock and substitution policies may have conﬂicting implications for forest man-
agement. Stock policies often imply longer rotations, at least when they provide incentives for
increasing carbon storage in biomass. Substitution policies, on the other hand, often lead to shorter
rotations as they provide forest owners with incentives to increase yields.1
The complementarities and trade-oﬀs between carbon sequestration in biomass and climate
beneﬁts of timber products have been recognized and studied since the mid-1990s at least (see
e.g., [Marland and Schlamadinger, 1997]). The studies typically rely on coupled forest manage-
ment / timber-products cycle models with geographical scales ranging from project level (e.g.,
[Masera et al., 2003]) to forest management unit (e.g., [Seidl et al., 2007]) to national level (e.g.,
[Hofer et al., 2007], [Pingoud et al., 2010]); and with focus ranging from single products to the
whole range of forest sector outputs.
Three key messages stem out of this literature. First, these studies consistently suggest that
higher carbon gains can be made by increasing timber use in long-lived products and burning
those for energy at end-of life, than by focusing directly on biomass energy. Second, the trade-
oﬀ between stock and substitution policies is not absolute, and strongly depend on the context.
Strategies that both increase carbon storage and increase substitution can be devised, notably
(following the previous point) via increased basal area and additional sawlog production. Third,
1The trade-oﬀ is not absolute, however, because for a variety of reasons forests are not necessarily harvested at
economically optimal rotation lengths, and because foresters can play on other variables than rotation lengths to
increase biomass or increase ﬂuxes of timber (e.g., density, intensity of thinning, choice of species, etc.). Moreover,
all the annual biological increment is not harvested. In this context of under-harvesting, implementing a substitution
policy does not necessarily lead to shorter rotations, at least at ﬁrst.
1time matters. For example, [Hofer et al., 2007] show in the Swiss case that stock policies lead to
the highest CO2 gains in the short term, but that sequestration policies take over in the medium-
to long-term.
However, the scenarios tested in this literature are typically expressed as changes in forest man-
agement practices–with little insights on the economic rationale that would drive those changes,
or even on their economic implications for forest owners. (One exception is [Seidl et al., 2007] who
complement their analysis of trade-oﬀs between storage and sequestration at the Forest Manage-
ment Unit in Austria with estimates of the opportunity cost of sequestration and substitution.)
This is because the underlying models do not usually capture economic dynamics, notably market
dynamics.
The objective of the present paper is thus to compare the implications of stock, substitution
and combined policies for both carbon accounting and for the economics of the French forest sector.
To do so, we rely on the French Forest Sector Model (FFSM, [Caurla et al., 2010a]) which couples
a dynamic model of the French timber resource and a dynamic, partial-equilibrium model of the
French forest sector. In particular, this framework allows us to specify our "stock" and "substitution"
policy scenarios as consistent market incentives, precisely, (i) a subsidy to fuelwood consumption
(substitution); (ii) a subsidy to carbon storage in standing forests (stock); and (iii) a combination
the two previous instruments built that rely on the same social value of carbon.
To this regard, our analysis rests on the same logic as [Eriksson et al., 2009], who discuss the
implications of increased timber use in the European construction sector by coupling forest resource
and socio-economic models (namely EFI-GTM), and thus go all the way to price and market
consequences. The diﬀerence is that we focus on a single country, focus on bioenergy, and, in the
current paper, test only price instruments instead of quantity instruments.
Our results show that the stock policy is the only carbon improving policy by the 2020 hori-
zon. Indeed, the important negative stock eﬀect is not compensated by the positive cumulative
substitution eﬀect when the substitution policy is implemented. In terms of welfare, consumers
and producers beneﬁt from a substitution policy. Consumers get negative welfare impacts from the
stock policy, while producers beneﬁt. Finally, combining both the stock and substitution policies
leads to an intermediary situation.
Section 2 presents the structure of the FFSM. Section 3 presents the three scenarios of public
policies. Section 4 analyzes the impacts of those policies, and section 5 concludes.
22 A Brief Introduction to the FFSM
The French Forest Sector Model (FFSM, [Caurla et al., 2010a]) is a dynamic simulation model
of the French forest sector. The model is built around two modules: a forest dynamics (FD)
module and an economic (E) module. At each period (year), the E module computes optimal
harvest given forest resources, transformation technology and capacity constraints, and supply and
demand functions for raw timber products and ﬁrst-transformation timber products. Imports are
represented on processed timber product markets while exports are represented on raw timber
product markets. Harvest levels are then passed on to the FD module, which computes the state of
the Forest at next period, and so forth. The model is implemented under GAMS and is currently







Figure 1: The French Forest Sector Model: a modular and recursive structure
The FD module simulates the growth of the timber stock using a diameter-class approach.
Relative to other European countries, French forests are very diverse in terms of climate, soils,
and species and types of management are historically very diverse, and forest dynamics highly
2In the current version, investment behaviors of both forest owners and transformation industry are exogenous,
thus making the model ill-suited to longer-term simulations.
3depend on those characteristics. Thus the dynamics of the forest in the FD module diﬀer by
region (22 administrative regions are considered), and within each region by type of management
(high forests, coppices, mixtures and uneven-aged forests), species (coniferous and broadleaved)
and diameter classes (13 diameter class); for a total of 1,716 diﬀerent cells or forest domains. The
FD module has been calibrated by the French forest inventory service ([Colin and Chevalier, 2009])
using data from the 2005-2007 French forest inventories.
The E module is a partial-equilibrium model of the French forest sector. It encompasses both raw
timber products (fuelwood, pulpwood, hardwood and softwood roundwood) and processed timber
products markets (hardwood sawnwood, softwood sawnwood, plywood, pulp, fuelwood, ﬁber and
particle board). Three groups of agents are thus represented in the model: forest owners (timber
suppliers), transformation industry and consumers (demand for processed goods)3. Inter-regional
trade (the E module distinguishes 22 administrative regions within France) is modeled assuming
perfect competition and full substitutability of products across regions, à la [Samuelson, 1952].
International trade between France and the Rest of the World is modeled assuming imperfect
substitutability using [Armington, 1969] framework. The E module is calibrated using literature
data and speciﬁc estimates, as presented in [Caurla et al., 2010a] and [Sauquet et al., 2010].
3 Policy scenarios
3.1 Substitution policy
We test three policy scenarios. First, a substitution policy (scenario S1) consisting of a public
subsidy to end-user fuelwood consumption. Fuelwood consumption is a clear example of substitu-
tion eﬀect. In fact, to the extent fuelwood originates from sustainably managed forests (a condition
that is met in France), fuelwood-based electricity and heat production emits less greenhouse gases
than fossil-fuel production would, as emissions from fuelwood combustion are compensated by forest
regrowth.
The market impacts of the fuelwood consumption subsidy are illustrated in Figure 2. The con-
sumer inverse demand curb is translated upwards by the amount of the subsidy s when the subsidy
is implemented. Consumers perceive a smaller price than the market price, which, everything else
equal, increases ﬁnal demand for fuelwood. As a result of the subsidy, demand shifts from q0 to q1
and the perceived price shifts from p0 to p1.









Figure 2: How consumers react when implementing a subsidy
We calibrate the subsidy assuming that it perfectly internalizes the social beneﬁts associated
with fuelwood consumption. The level of the subsidy is thus computed as the amount of carbon
saved per cubic meter of fuelwood consumed (substitution coeﬃcient) times the social price of
carbon.
The substitution coeﬃcient depends on the eﬃciency of the energy production technology, of the
type of fuelwood that is used (pellets, sticks, logging residues) and of the nature of the substitute
(gas, oil, renewables). According to the French Environment and Energy Management Agency
([ADEME, 2005]) burning 1 m3 of fuelwood saves approximately 0.625 ton of CO2 on average.4
We retain this ﬁgure in the paper.
There is currently no consensus on the social price of carbon, because of uncertainties about
both the risks associated with climate change, and the costs of mitigation and adaptation (e.g.,
[Watkiss and Downing, 2008]). In the present paper, we use the recently announced value of 17
4The coeﬃcient is low relative to other Europan countries because of the dominant share of nuclear in French
electricity mix.
5euro per ton of CO2 as an indication of domestic willingness to pay for climate mitigation. We also
assume that this value increases linearly by 2 euros per year to reach 37 euro/tCO2 in 2020.5
Increased use of other timber products relative to BAU are assumed to result in net gains in
GHG emissions. The products include, inter alia, use of timber beams for framing (reducing use of
emissions-intensive steel), of paper bags (instead of plastic), or of timber ﬂooring (instead of plastic
or carpets). Yet these products are not considered in the present paper for three reasons. First,
the emissions savings occur in the production process, not in the consumption process. As a result,
the gains may be diﬃcult to trace and attribute, especially for end products of complex production
chains. Second, substitution coeﬃcients are often uncertain, and depend strongly on normative
assumptions such as, for example, whether end-of-life emissions are accounted for or not. Third,
existing climate policies focus solely on biomass energy, and do not fully cover over substitution
eﬀects.
Finally, the choice of a subsidy as policy instrument is justiﬁed for two reasons. First, price
instruments are eﬃcient ways of internalizing externalities in the context of perfectly competitive
markets–as modeled in the FFSM. Second, a price mechanism allows for easy coordination with
stock policies (via the socially agreed price of carbon). We have examined elsewhere alternative
policies, notably the introduction of a ﬁxed demand by the Government ([Caurla et al., 2009]).
3.2 Stock policy
The second policy scenario we test (S2) consists of retributing forest owners for the environ-
mental service of carbon storage in excess of business-as-usual (BAU). Each year, timber suppliers
thus receive a payment from the Government (Pt) computed as the diﬀerence between the amount
of carbon sequestered in standing forest (Ct) relative to BAU (CBAU
t ), times the price of carbon se-
questration (Pct): Pt = Pct(Ct−CBAU
t ). Note that the payment can be negative (tax) if the carbon
stock falls below BAU level. We only consider above-ground biomass, which under-estimates the
environmental service, but allows for easier accounting. And we use the rule-of-thumb approxima-
tion that one cubic meter of standing biomass stores one metric ton of CO2 ([Dupouey et al., 1999];
[Carbofor, 2004]).
5In 2009, the French administration proposed an across-the-board carbon tax or "contribution climat énergie"
(CCE). Expert recommended an initial value of 32 euros per ton of CO2 ([MEEDDAT, 2009], [Quinet, 2009]) with a
2.4 euro per year increase until 2020. But after negotiations the President ﬁnally announced a 17 €/tCO2 (Presidential
speech on climate mitigation, Artemare, 10 September). After being partly struck down by the constitutional council,
the CCE was withdrawn undeﬁnitely in early 2010.
6The annual retribution for carbon storage pc,t is the constant annual value corresponding to
a price of permanent (i.e., indeﬁnite) sequestration of pc deﬁned in the above section–based on
a 4% discount rate. This annuity is revised every year as the price of permanent sequestration
increases (see previous section)–thus it goes from 0.68 €/tCO2 per year to 1.48 €/tCO2. The stock
policy is thus environmentally consistent. In particular, accidental release of carbon via e.g., ﬁres
or hurricanes, would not compromise the environmental integrity of the policy. The forest owners
would simply see their annual payment decrease (or even become negative if carbon stocks fall
below BAU).
In the current version of the FFSM, at any given period, forest owners choose their level of supply
depending only on current market prices. As a result, in the current version of the model, forest
owners will factor the retribution for carbon storage in their supply decisions only to the extent
it does inﬂuence the current price of timber. Since carbon storage is directly (and negatively)
correlated with timber harvest, the stock policy creates an opportunity cost to timber supply and
it impacts on forest producers as a "tax" of the same amount would. However, this analogy is
contingent on the fact that, in the current version of the model, expectations about future revenues
and/or costs, and in particular the fact that the carbon payment will be repeated as long as the
carbon is stored, do not enter into timber suppliers’ decisions.6
Figure 3 shows how the stock policy reduces the timber supply. When the policy is implemented,
timber suppliers integrate the new opportunity cost of the stock policy in their supply behavior,
which shifts upward the supply curve.
The stock policy we test is a natural extension of payments for carbon sequestration already
in place in projects under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, or in the
so-called "voluntary carbon market" (see [Hamilton et al., 2009] for a review). To our knowledge,
however, there is currently no policy in operation that would pay forest owners for carbon storage in
standing forests (as opposed to new ones) on a regional or national scale (as opposed to individual
projects).7
It is important to note here the voluntary nature of the policy. Timber suppliers will self-select
themselves and will enter the programme only if it makes them better oﬀ. We do not introduce
6The current model can also be interpreted as assuming that timber suppliers have no conﬁdence in the Government
ability to sustain the subsidy, and thus react only to the current price signal, and not to the future ones.
7Under Article 3.4. of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I countries may elect to account for variations in carbon
storage in designated standing forests to help meet their overall obligations. To our knowledge however, no Annex I








Figure 3: Eﬀect of a tax on supplier behaviour
the participation constraint directly into the model, but instead we test ex post whether suppliers
are better oﬀ or not.
Finally, note that the choice of the reference scenario will aﬀect individual owners decisions to
participate or not in the scheme, but not their timber supply decisions at the margin (only the
annualized value of sequestration matters here). To the extent participation is constant, thus, any
reference would yield the same results for timber markets (e.g., current level, "average" level over a
given period of time, zero, etc.), but with very diﬀerent distributional implications. In practice the
choice of a reference result from a trade-oﬀ between levels of transfers, risks of non-participation,
and costs of measurement of and agreement upon a reference.
3.3 Combination and BAU
Finally, we test a third scenario (S3) consisting of a combination of S1 and S2. S3 is an inter-
esting case per se. On the one hand, economic theory recommends to price the carbon externality
across the board. Since sequestration and substitution eﬀects are diﬀerent, it makes sense to value
them jointly. On the other hand, as noted in the introduction, sequestration and substitution poli-
8cies may pull forest owners in diﬀerent directions, and their eﬀects may thus cancel out, at heavy
costs to society. Moreover, welfare implications for forest owners and consumers are unclear. Hence
this combination scenario.
All three policy scenarios are discussed against a business-as-usual scenario (BAU). In this
reference scenario, we keep base year demand functions, transformation capacity, and world market
prices constant (in real terms) from 2006 to 2020. As a result, market equilibrium do not evolve
markedly from 2006 to 2020. In particular, above-ground biomass stock continues to increase
at high rate (+56 Mm3 per year or +6.5% per year on average), following observed trends, and
consistent with medium-term projections of the French Forest Inventory Service.
Our simulations are conducted from 2006 to 2020. We assume in each case that the policies are
introduced in 2010 and sustained until 2020, with the price of carbon increasing as discussed in the
previous section.
4 Policy Outcome Analysis
This section is organized as follows. First, we discuss the implications of the three policy
scenarios relative to BAU in terms of GHG emissions and sequestration (environmental assessment).
Next, we discuss market implications and welfare impacts for the various stakeholders in the forest
sector (economic assessment).
4.1 Carbon Implications
4.1.1 Carbon in Standing Forests
The substitution policy increases demand for fuelwood by 30% or 0.80 Mm3 relative to business-
as-usual (BAU) in 2020. Though fuelwood imports increase (+43% relative to BAU in 2020), the
bulk of the increment comes from increased harvesting of national forests–because fuelwood imports
are a small share of consumption in the BAU. As a result, the carbon stock in standing forests
decreases. It is approximately 7.1 MtCO2 lower in 2020 with the substitution policy than it would
have been without (see Figure 4).
Conversely, and as expected, the stock policy increases carbon storage in standing forests. The
variation, however, is nearly one order of magnitude smaller (+0.9 MtCO2 in 2020 relative to BAU)
(see Figure 4). Thus, when the two policies are combined, the negative impact of the biomass energy
































Figure 4: Carbon sequestered in standing forest between 2010 and 2020
S3, carbon stock decreases relative to BAU by nearly the same amount as in the sequestration
policy (-6.1 MtCO2 instead of -7.1 MtCO2).
4.1.2 Substitution
Substitution is accounted for using the stock change approach to imports and exports. In par-
ticular, substitution caused by imported fuelwood is accounted for, whereas substitution generated
abroad by French fuelwood export is not. We make the assumption that imported fuelwood has
the same substitution coeﬃcient than domestic fuelwood ([Brown et al., 1999], [Lim et al., 1999]).
The implications for substitution are opposite to those for carbon stock in standing forests. The
substitution policy leads to higher fuelwood consumption, and thus to higher substitution gains.
In cumulative terms, the fuelwood subsidy increases substitution by 3.7 MtCO2 relative to BAU
between 2010 and 2020 (+16%). When the price of carbon is maximal in 2020, sequestration is
about +0.5 MtCO2 over BAU (+30%) (Figure 5).
Conversely, the stock policy tends to limit timber supply, including (but not limited to) fuelwood
































Figure 5: Cumulative CO2 emissions savings from substitution between 2006 and 2020
two orders of magnitude smaller than the impact of the sequestration policy (-0.05 MtCO2 related
to BAU over the 2010-2020 period or -0.2%, -0.006 MtCO2 relative to BAU in 2020). Combining
the two policies has basically the same eﬀect on substitution as the substitution policy alone.
Figure 6 summarizes the total carbon implications of the diﬀerent policies. To remain consistent,
we add up variations in carbon stored in standing forests with cumulative substitution eﬀect over
the 2010-2020 period.
Overall, the stock policy turns out to be the most beneﬁcial in carbon terms over the 2010-
2020 period. In fact, S2 is the only scenario in which total carbon increases relative to baseline
(+0.9 MtCO2 over 2010-2020). The sequestration policy, on the other hand, leads to a net de-
crease in carbon (-3.4 MtCO2 over 2010-2020) because the policy drain on standing biomass is
not compensated by cumulative substitution. Combining stock and ﬂux policies does improve the
environmental balance, but it remains negative (-2.5 MtCO2 relative to BAU over the 2010-2020
period), as the increase in storage due to the storage subsidy is not suﬃcient to oﬀset the loss due





































Figure 6: Total cumulative CO2 impact (stock and substitution) between 2006 and 2020
4.1.3 Discussion
Two main comments should be made on the results above.
First, as noted above, the stock and ﬂux policies turn out to be highly asymmetric despite
being based on the same price of carbon. This can be explained by the fact that the stock policy
compensates forest owners for one year of sequestration, whereas the substitution policy pays for
the permanent substitution eﬀect. On the demand side, the subsidy perceived by consumers in 2020
is thus 37 × 0.625 = 23.1€ per m3 of fuelwood, i.e., an increase of 60% relative to BAU. Whereas
on the supply side, at any given point in time, the opportunity cost of putting an additional cubic
meter of timber on the market is only 1.4 €/tCO2, or 5.3% of the average price paid to producers
for fuelwood in 2020 in the BAU (and less than 3% of the average price of roundwood).
Obviously, as discussed above, the model only captures the ﬁrst order impact of the stock policy
on timber supply. Forward-looking forest owners may withdraw more volume from the market to
take advantage of the compounded payments associated with the stock policy. Yet the situation
will be very diﬀerent between coppice and high forest managers. Coppice managers may react to
the sequestration subsidy by increasing rotation lengths, thereby temporarily withdrawing more
12fuelwood from the market, until a new equilibrium is reached. High forests managers, on the other
hand, may use the carbon policy to reduce harvests of low- to medium-diameter trees, thereby
limiting supply in the short run, but potentially increasing supply of high-value roundwood in the
longer term. Taking these dynamic eﬀects into account would require to revise the supply function
of the model and take expectations into account–a research area currently in progress. But this
simulation already points to fundamental diﬀerences in stock and substitution policies.
The second important point is that we ﬁnd that the stock policy dominates the substitution
policy in the short run. This is consistent with previous studies (e.g., [Hofer et al., 2007]), but
contingent on (i) our choice of considering biomass energy only ; and (ii) on the characteristics
of the French energy system, which generates electricity with a carbon content about one ﬁfth of
KWh produced in Germany or the U.S. The ranking between the policy may change if we were to
extend the simulation horizon suﬃciently.
The above results also provide some insights on the costs of mitigation in France, and about the
feasibility of Governmental objectives of increasing fuelwood energy consumption by circa 8 Mm3
in 2020 relative to current levels. Both points are discussed in the conclusion of the paper.
4.2 Welfare Implications
In this section, we examine the welfare implications of the three policy scenarios for three groups
of agents: consumers, producers and the government. The FFSM also represents the transformation
industry and the transportation agents, but their proﬁt at equilibrium is zero in all three policy
scenarios as well as in the BAU. Thus, they are not considered below. This section ﬁrst presents
the methodology, and then discusses welfare implications. Two additional subsections deal with
mitigation costs and international trade eﬀects respectively.
4.2.1 Methodology
Consumer surplus: Consumers surplus variation under the stock policy is straightforward. Un-
der the substitution policy, consumers demand curve shifts downward by the amount of the subsidy.
As a result, market equilibrium shifts from (p0,q0) to (p1,q1). Consumer surplus variation is the
grey area on Figure 7.
Producers proﬁts: Producers proﬁts variation under the substitution policy is straightforward.
Producers proﬁts variation under the stock policy (and the combination policy) are more com-









Figure 7: Consumer welfare variation when subsidy to fuelwood consumption is implemented
First, producers reaction to the payment for sequestration is to shift their supply curve upward
by the amount of the subsidy. As a result, the market equilbrium shifts from (p0,q0) to (p1,q1),
with a higher price and a lower quantity. The net impact on proﬁt is the diﬀerence between the
areas A and B on Figure 8, and its sign is ambiguous.
Second, producers do beneﬁt from the payment for the tons of carbon sequestered in excess
of BAU. The value of this payment is simply the price of annual carbon sequestration times the
amount sequestered in excess of BAU.
Government budget: The impact of the substitution policy on the Government budget is simply
the product of the subsidy rate times the amount of fuelwood consumed.
Similarly, the impact of the stock policy on the Government budget is the price of annual carbon
sequestration times the diﬀerence between observed and BAU carbon stocks.
4.2.2 Welfare Impacts
Table 1 summarizes the welfare implications of the three policy scenarios relative to BAU. The











Figure 8: Producer welfare variation when tax to supply is implemented
mechanisms, to producers, with large costs for the Government and an overall deadweight loss of
circa 18 M€ in 2020.
The stock policy has very limited impact, and therefore very limited overall eﬀect. However,
distributional implications are staringly diﬀerent from the previous case, as the Government and
consumers lose and producers win. It is important to note here that the about 80% of the producers
welfare comes from increased prices, and not from the subsidy itself.
The ﬁgures for the combination policy (S3) look quite similar to those of the substitution
policy, but there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences. As noted above, the fuelwood subsidy dominates
Stakeholder Substitution Policy (S1) Stock Policy (S2) Combination (S3)
Consumers +40.85 M€ -6.28 M€ +34,87 M€
Producers +20.8 M€ +7.37 M€ +17.53 M€
Government -79.40 M€ -1.36 M€ -66.18 M€
Aggregate -17.8 M€ -0.27 M€ -13.97 M€
Table 1: Aggregate Welfare Impacts of stock and substitution policies in 2020 relative to BAU
15the sequestration subsidy, and producers increase harvests relative to baseline. As a result, the
sequestration component of the policy turns into a net gain for the government as it taxes reduction
in carbon storage relative to BAU. This gain is signiﬁcant (+9 M€ in 2020), though not suﬃcient
to oﬀset the costs associated with the subsidy.
Consumer welfare: Total consumer surplus increases by +40.85 M€ when implementing the
subsidy to fuelwood consumption. Since our fuelwood and roundwood markets are separated,
and since resource is abundant enough for the fuel and pulp industry not to be in competition,
all processed product markets are independent, and the surplus change concerns only fuelwood
consumers ([Caurla et al., 2009]).
Conversely, the stock policy leads to a loss in consumer surplus by increasing the price of pro-
cessed goods. All consumers are concerned, since the stock policy concerns all producers. However,
this loss is relatively small: -6.28 M€ for all consumers and -0.66 M€ for fuelwood consumers.8
Overall, the combination of stock and substitution policies leads to an intermediary situation
where consumer surplus increases, but less so than with the substitution policy alone (+34,87
M€). Thus, the substitution policy is unambiguously the most welfare improving for fuelwood
consumers. In other words, the policy with the best carbon implication is also the only one which
hurts consumers surplus. We come back to the policy implications of this result below.
Producers surplus: We ﬁnd that the substitution policy increases fuelwood producer surplus
by +20,80 M€. Indeed, by increasing processed goods market prices, this policy also increases raw
materials market prices. Since both prices and quantities increase, the producer surplus unambigu-
ously increases. As noted above, the fact that the markets be de facto separated explains why the
surplus of non-fuelwood producers is not aﬀected.
Interestingly, we also ﬁnd that the stock policy increases suppliers’ welfare (and in this case, all
of them). For most producers, in fact, the limitation of supply induced by the policy (eﬀect 1 above)
results in welfare increase, as additional revenue linked to price increase more than compensates
the loss of revenue due to supply reduction. When the subsidy to sequestration is added up (eﬀect
2), the result is always positive. Overall, the subsidy to sequestration represents only 20% of total
producers’ surplus gain in 2020. The fact that eﬀect 1 usually turns out positive can be explained
as follows. By restricting supply without actual taxation (the "tax" is only an opportunity cost),
8Note that increasing the supply price elasticity, decreasing the demand price elasticity and increasing the carbon
price increases this positive impact (see appendix A).
16the policy can be interpreted as an incentive for producers to restrict supply relative to competitive
market equilibrium, and move towards less competitive equilibrium.
When combining the two policies, the producers surplus increases in an intermediate manner
(+17.23 M€). This is because timber harvested is larger in S3 than under BAU (because of the
substitution policy); then the stock policy plays as a tax to forest owners. If we consider that the
stock policy is voluntary, the policy maker then needs to take into account the fact that forest
owners may not enter the policy in S3 (they would prefer not to enter and get the surplus from S1).
This raises the question of the choice of the BAU (which is an usual question of designing payments
for environmental services) and the voluntary nature of the policy. If the BAU is chosen as as
situation without any policy, and if another policy (which is our case), with larger and opposite
impacts (i.e the substitution policy) is implemented at the same time as the stock policy, then forest
owners may choose not to enter the voluntary policy. This is represented by a trade oﬀ between
the gain in producers surpluses in S3 and S1.
Government budget: The substitution policy retributes all fuelwood consumers with a subsidy
that reduces perceived fuelwood price, for a total cost of 79.40 M€. Most of this total cost (75 %)
is related to a windfall eﬀect, which is the cost of the subsidy related to fuelwood that would have
been consumed anyway (i.e., in the BAU). This raises questions of its cost eﬀectiveness.
Conversely, because of its smaller overall impact, the stock policy is cheaper, costing only 1.36
M€. Nevertheless, because of its cumulative nature (timber not harvested today is retributed year
after year), it is important to note that the cost of this policy increases one year after another.
Finally, combining the two policies has an intermediate eﬀect. Indeed, the stock policy retributes
forest owners with respect to a BAU without any policy. When combining the two policies, the
eﬀect of the substitution policy (increased harvest) is far more important than the eﬀect of the
stock policy (reducing timber supply). It follows that timber supply in S3 is larger than in BAU.
Then the stock policy plays here as a tax to forest owners, since they harvest more than under
BAU.
4.2.3 Implications for Mitigation Costs
The analysis also provides insights on the opportunity cost of mitigation in the forest sector.
Three notions of mitigation costs must be distinguished. Our policies are based on a social
cost of carbon, which represents the marginal cost to society associated with the emission of one
metric tonne of CO2. This value should not be confused with the average welfare cost of the
17mitigation policy, which measures the average impact of the policy on Society (i.e., total welfare
variation relative to BAU divided by carbon saved relative to BAU).9 Finally, governments may
pay particular attention to the average budgetary costs of mitigation (i.e., additional government
expenditures relative to BAU divided by carbon saved relative to BAU), though–unlike total welfare
costs–they depend on the redistribution scheme associated with the diﬀerent policy scenarios.
Overall, the substitution policy (S1) leads to an increase in net carbon emissions relative to
BAU. Strictly speaking, there is thus no mitigation. However, if the decrease in in situ carbon
stock is ignored, and if only the end-use substitution eﬀect is accounted for, the policy then results
in eﬀective mitigation, and mitigation costs can be estimated. The average welfare cost of mitigation
ranges between 25 (in 2010) and 35 €/tCO2 (in 2020). Interestingly, this average is higher than the
price of carbon for most of the period, because of the indirect distortive impacts of the policy on
the market add to the total costs. Of course, average budgetary cost of mitigation is much higher
(circa 160 €/tCO2) because of the large windfall eﬀect of the fuelwood subsidy.
The stock policy, on the other hand, has a positive impact on total carbon. The average
budgetary cost of annual sequestration is simply the social cost of carbon (i.e., from 0.68 €/tCO2
to 1.48 €/tCO2/year). On the other hand, average welfare costs of annual sequestration diminish
over time (from 2.90 to 0.31 €/tCO2/year). This might be explained by the fact that, in our
simulations, available resource largely exceeds demand for fuelwood. As a result, trees that are
withdrawn from harvest at year t will not restrict supply at subsequent years, and thus do not
lead to additional costs to society. Hence an increasing stock of carbon but costs that remain
concentrated at the margin.
4.2.4 Trade implications
Both policies, trough their price eﬀects have an impact on international trade. As mentioned
before, the substitution policy tends to increase both the raw and processed markets prices for
fuelwood. It follows that French fuelwood is less competitive vis à vis international prices, which
result in an increase in fuelwood imports (+43 %) and a decrease in fuelwood exports (-6 %).
The stock policy also leads to an increase in prices, which has the same type of trade eﬀects.
However, those eﬀects are smaller than under a substitution policy. There is almost no impact on
fuelwood imports (+0.1%), while fuelwood exports decrease by 2%.
9Since our model is only a partial-equilibrium model, it does not capture welfare variations for actors beyond the
forest sector, and thus does not capture all the welfare impacts of our policies.
18Both eﬀects cumulate when both policies are combined. It follows that fuelwood imports in-
crease by 43% and fuelwood exports decrease by 7%.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to explore the eﬀects on the French forest sector of three policies
to mitigate climate change: a fuelwood consumption subsidy (substitution), a payment for carbon
sequestration in standing forest (stock) and a combination of the two previous instruments. Our
analysis yields ﬁve key results.
First, in our simulations, the stock policy has a better impact on total net carbon emissions
than a substitution policy. In fact, the stock policy is the only policy to have a positive eﬀect on net
carbon emissions in the 2010 - 2020 period. This result is consistent with previous analysis in the
literature (e.g., [Hofer et al., 2007]), but it is contingent on three sets of factors: (i) The energy mix
in France is far less carbon-intensive than in other European countries, thus limiting the impact
of the substitution policy; (ii) The substitution policy we have tested concerns only carbon, and
not other wood products which also generate substitution eﬀects; (iii) Finally, the ranking between
stock and substitution would probably change in the long-run as the impact on the standing stock
levels oﬀ and the substitution eﬀects accumulate.
Second, our simulations raise questions about the political economy of the stock policy. Unlike
the substitution policy, which increases both consumers and producers surplus, the stock policy is
detrimental to consumers surplus (though it increases producers surplus). It is thus politically more
diﬃcult to implement. In addition, the choice of the reference for the stock policy proves crucial.
To the extent the stock policy is voluntary, it requires that forest owners be better oﬀ entering the
policy than staying outside. It follows that if a voluntary stock policy is implemented jointly with
a substitution policy giving large incentives to intensify harvests (scenario 3), forest owners may
be better oﬀ not entering the PES scheme. Yet public budget constraints will limit governments
ability to lower the reference. Finally, the reference must be easy to negociate, which in particular
means transparent and easy to compute.
Third, in our simulations, combining the stock and the substitution policy is not superior to
either stock or substitution alone. This is because combining the two policies leads to providing
conﬂicting incentives to forest owners, with policies pulling in opposite directions. This result,
however, is contingent on the nature of the policy that we have tested. In particular, stock and
substitution policies aiming at diﬀerent sets of producers and consumers might have synergies. In
19addition, complementarities may emerge in the long-run as we reach new resource equilibrium (as
suggested in e.g., [Pingoud et al., 2010]).
Fourth, our results shed light on the feasibility of the French 2020 biomass consumption objec-
tives. In fact, the report of the "Assises de la forêt" (2008) calls for harvests +21 Mm3 higher in
2020 than in 2006. This volume would be split into +9 Mm3 for building timber and +12 Mm3
for fuelwood. Yet in our simulations, under realistic prices of carbon, the fuelwood subsidy we test
leads to an increase in consumption of only 0.8 Mm3 relative to 2006. Even with a carbon price
increasing to 57€/tCO2 in 2020, fuelwood consumption in 2020 would barely increase by more than









































































































Figure 9: Growth of fuelwood consumption when retributing substitution eﬀect with a consumer
subsidy
The current version of the FFSM probably underestimates markets reactions to the substitution
policy. This is because the current price elasticity of demand (-0.6) is closer to a short-run than to
a long-run elasticity. This kind of demand function focuses on existing consumers, and omits new
entrants. The diﬃculty is that the (formal) fuelwood market in France is still quite small. Thus,
there is no data to estimate long-run elasticities. A direction for future research is thus to try and
20model investment in biomass energy generation capacity explicitly. However, very high elasticities
of demand (higher than 2) are necessary to reach the Government 2020 objectives at reasonable
carbon prices. Thus, in addition to a subsidy, a mechanism based on a public ﬁxed-demand in
which the government guarantees that it will purchase a ﬁxed volume to provide public power
plants could help in targeting national goals [Caurla et al., 2009].
Appendix A: Sensitivity analysis
A - 1: Price elasticities
Our results are conditioned by assumptions on fuelwood price elasticity of supply (equal to 1 in
our model) and fuelwood price elasticity of demand (equal to -0,6). Indeed while price elasticities
are well-known for most timber products, they are more uncertain for fuelwood markets. Indeed,
fuelwood markets are quite small as most fuelwood consumption is currently serviced either out
of the market (via, e.g., self-production or collective timber supply at municipality level) or via
informal markets. In this context, it is diﬃcult to anticipate how would agents behave if fuelwood
markets develop quickly. Thus we thus test two other demand elasticities and an other supply
elasticity.
Carbon stock in standing forests: Results are shown in Figure 10a and 10b. Figure 10a
shows that when demand becomes less elastic (elasticity moving closer 0), the negative impact of
the substitution policy on the forest stock is lower. That can be explained by a decrease in harvest
levels. The same mechanism applies for the supply elasticity: when supply becomes less elastic,
harvest levels tend to decrease and the negative impact on the stock is smaller.
The stock policy has just the opposite implications from a change in price elasticity of demand
and supply. When supply or demand become more inelastic, harvests increase and the carbon
stock decreases. Indeed when the policy is implemented, raw timber supply decreases. Then raw
timber prices increases, meanwhile a lower price elasticity to supply or demand means a loss in
agent sensitivity to price variation.
Substitution eﬀect: Increasing the price elasticity of supply and demand tends to increase
the positive eﬀect of the substitution policy while it increases negative eﬀect of the stock policy
(Figures 11a and 11b). Same mechanisms than the one for carbon in standing forest applies:


































￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿"￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿"￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿"#


































































￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
































￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿!
(d) Sensitivity to discounting rate
Figure 10: Carbon stock in standing forest: Sensitivity analysis
A2 - Carbon price
As shown in ﬁgure 10c, sensitivity to the carbon price is quite important for the substitution
policy while it smaller for the stock policy, despite the fact that we consider consistent carbon
prices for both policies. Indeed, our stock policy is calibrated on the value of the rent for one
year of carbon sequestration while the substitution policy retributes the permanent substitution of
non-emitted carbon. As shown in Figure 11c, the substitution policy is very sensitive to the carbon
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(d) Sensibility to discounting rate
Figure 11: Cumulative substitution in the forest industry: sensibility analysis
A3 - Discount rate
The discount rate only plays on the carbon price in the stock policy. It follows that the
substitution policy is not sensitive to it. Increasing the discount rate (and thus increasing annual
rent) tends to increase the eﬀectiveness of the stock policy: increase in carbon sequestration (Figure
10d), and small decrease in carbon substitution (Figure 11d).
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